The inability of emerging market economies to borrow in domestic currency in international financial markets often leaves them vulnerable to fluctuations in the real exchange rate. In these countries, real exchange rate depreciations are associated with declines in output, which increase the cost of foreign currency debt exactly when the repayment capacity is low, thereby hindering debt service. This paper develops a twosector small open economy model to analyze the effect of debt denomination on default risk and interest rates in emerging markets. Default risk is determined endogenously and depends on the incentives for repayment. The economy can borrow using bonds denominated in tradable or nontradable goods, which are used as proxies for foreign currency and domestic currency debt respectively. The model predicts, in line with empirical evidence, that tradable denominated debt increases the default risk and leads to higher interest rates. As a result, the amount of debt that can be sustained by the economy increases with an increase in nontradable-indexed borrowing. In addition, this type of debt is shown to reduce the default rate and interest rate volatility and increase the welfare.
Introduction
The inability to borrow in domestic currency in international financial markets is a widespread phenomenon among emerging market economies 1 . The problems associated with foreign currency borrowing have become apparent after the recent emerging market crises and have been the subject of a vast literature. This issue has been analyzed as a factor leading to currency crises, as well as affecting the policy options of governments in responding to crises. Another aspect of foreign currency borrrowing, which received more attention after the Argentine crisis, is its effect on sovereign default risk. In many papers and policy discussions, large amounts of foreign currency debt has been pointed out as one of the factors leading to default in Argentina 2 . It has also been documented by Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003a, 2003b ) that, credit ratings deteriorate as the share of foreign currency debt increases, reflecting a higher sovereign default risk.
The reason for debt denomination to affect the default risk is that real exchange rate fluctuations become relevant for repayment capacity when debt is denominated in foreign currency. The reason for this to cause a problem in developing countries is the co-movement of output and real exchange rates. In these countries real exchange rate depreciations are associated with output declines, increasing the value of foreign currency denominated debt exactly when the country's repayment ability has deteriorated 3 . Therefore, with a high share of foreign currency debt, debt service becomes even harder during low output episodes.
This paper analyzes how having to borrow in foreign currency affects default incentives and the interest rate behavior of emerging market economies. In order to study the rela- 1 Table A1 in the appendix shows foreign currency debt as a share of total international debt for select country groups. In developing countries, the average share of foreign currency debt is about 2.5% for the period 1993-2001. 2 See Hausmann and Velasco (2002), Feldstein (2002) , Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) , Perry and Serven (2003) . 3 Figure A2 in the appendix plots real exchange rate and output in different emerging market economies. Both series are HP filtered.
tionships between default risk, debt denomination and real exchange rate fluctuations, a stochastic small open economy model with endogenous default risk and equilibrium default is considered. The paper is based on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2005) in its modeling of endogenous default risk. The borrowing country has the option of defaulting on its debt, in which case it will be temporarily excluded from international borrowing and lending, and lose a share of its output. Interest rates, then, are determined endogenously as a function of the default probability of the economy. A real model is considered with two goods, tradables and nontradables, where the endowments of both goods are stochastic.
The economy can borrow using either bonds denominated in tradable goods (analogous to foreign currency debt) or bonds whose return is indexed to the relative price of the nontradable good (analogous to domestic currency debt). The price of nontradables is determined by the stochastic shocks to tradable and nontradable endowments. In the data, the correlation between real exchange rates and output in developing countries is such that output declines are associated with depreciation of the real exchange rate. For the type of shocks that generate this correlation between real exchange rates and output, I show that indexing the value of foreign liabilities to the price of nontradables reduces default risk. Since the nontradable price is high during good times and low during bad times, the repayment value of nontradable denominated debt moves in the same direction as output, which improves international risk sharing and reduces default incentives.
Modeling of foreign and domestic currency debt as bonds indexed to the tradable and nontradable goods captures the change in the relative value of debt denominated in different currencies. What makes foreign currency debt harder to repay is an increase in its value relative to the real value of the country's output through a real depreciation. In the model, a real exchange rate depreciation reduces the value of nontradable indexed debt while the value of tradable indexed debt is constant. Therefore, tradable indexed debt becomes relatively more costly with a real depreciation just as foreign currency debt becomes more costly compared with domestic currency debt. This kind of a formulation has been used by other papers like Schneider and Tornell (2000) and Chamon (2002) , while Krugman (1999) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003) also use real models where they model foreign and domestic currency debt as borrowing with bonds denominated in domestic and foreign goods.
The model is solved quantitatively using data from the Argentine economy. The results show that default incentives, and hence interest rates, increase as the share of tradable denominated debt increases. Therefore, the model predicts that the default risk is higher when debt is denominated in foreign currency, in line with the empirical evidence. The results also show important differences for the volatility of interest rates and the default rate as well as the correlation of output and interest rates between the cases of tradable and nontradable denominated debt. Borrowing with nontradable denominated bonds reduces the volatility of interest rates and the default rate of the country as this type of borrowing provides better insurance against low output states. It also leads to a higher level of welfare since a smoother consumption profile can be achieved due to the fact that repayment on nontradable indexed debt decreases in bad times and increases in good times. The model matches the countercyclicality of interest rates when debt is denominated in tradable units, which is in line with the increase in interest rates observed during low output episodes in emerging market economies. However, this prediction changes when debt is indexed to the nontradable price, in which case interest rates become procyclical. This paper is the first to theoretically analyze the effects of currency denomination of debt in the context of sovereign default risk, although other aspects of debt denomination have received considerable attention in the literature.
One strand of the literature has analyzed the effects of foreign currency debt on the occurrence of currency crises and on the optimal monetary and exchange rate policy. The emphasis in this set of papers is on the balance sheet effects of a currency depreciation when firms are credit constrained, in the sense that the amount that can be borrowed depends on the net worth of the firm. With debt denominated in foreign currency, a depreciation has contractionary effects through a reduction in net worth. This, in turn, reduces the amount that can be borrowed and constrains investment. Therefore, the effects of a bad shock are amplified, and this may lead to multiple equilibria where changes in expectations trigger a crisis. The role of foreign currency debt in financial crises through such a channel has been studied by papers such as Krugman (1999) and Banerjee (2001a, 2001b) . Another aspect of the same channel is that foreign currency debt affects the policy response to crises. The conventional policy prescription in responding to an adverse shock has been to engage in expansionary monetary policy. This, however, increases the repayment problems of firms and banks in the presence of foreign currency debt by leading to a depreciation of the currency. This line of reasoning has been used by Banerjee (2000, 2001a) , Bacchetta (2000) and Velasco (2000, 2002) in analyzing optimal monetary and exchange rate policy in the presence of foreign currency debt. In this paper, I analyze foreign currency debt in relation to sovereign default risk rather than currency crises, and in this setup, foreign currency debt directly affects the default incentives of the government without resorting to the balance sheet channel.
Another strand of literature has developed around studying the reasons for the inability of developing countries to borrow in their domestic currency. In the case of public debt, this has been explained by the government's incentives to create inflation and erode the value of debt when it is time to repay (Calvo and Guidotti, 1990 ). In the case of private borrowing, explanations offered are bailout guarantees (Schneider and Tornell, 2000 ; Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2000), lack of domestic financial development (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2003) , expectations of a large monetary expansion associated with a risky monetary environment (Jeanne, 2002 ) and the correlation of default risk with real depreciations and inability to enforce creditor seniority in foreign debt contracts (Chamon, 2002 ). This paper, however, will take the inability of developing countries to borrow in their domestic currency as given and analyze how it affects the default risk and interest rate behavior of these countries.
In terms of the model used, the paper is related to Arellano (2005) , Aguiar and Gopinath (2003a), Yue (2005) and Sapriza and Cuadra (2005) . Each of these papers models default risk endogenously as dependent on the incentives for repayment, and studies the implications of such a model in terms of default risk, interest rates and business cycle properties.
In all of these studies, borrowing is done with bonds that pay one unit of output regardless of the state of the economy, which is the same as the tradable denominated bonds in my model 4 . Therefore, the implicit assumption in these papers is that the value of the amount to be repaid moves with value of the tradable good as in foreign currency borrowing. The distinguishing feature of my paper is to introduce another bond that is indexed to the non- is reduced. The foreign lenders charge a premium on lending based on the expected default probability of the government. Borrowing can be done using two types of bonds: a tradable denominated bond (T-bond) which delivers one unit of tradable good next period and a nontradable denominated bond (N-bond) which delivers an amount of tradable good equivalent to one unit of nontradable good. In the case of a default, I assume that the government defaults fully and on both types of debt.
Households
Households are infinitely lived and have preferences over consumption of tradable, nontradable, and publicly provided consumption goods:
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor; c The budget constraint of the household is as follows:
where τ is the tax levied on the nontradable endowment. Households receive a transfer of the public good, g t , that is distributed as a lump sum by the government.
P
N is the relative price of the nontradable good where the tradable price is normalized to 1. Since purchasing power parity is assumed to hold for the tradable sector, the real exchange rate for this small economy is the domestic consumption-based price index P C , which is an increasing function of the nontradable price, P N .
Government
The government's objective is to maximize the lifetime utility of the households. It provides a public good by taxing the nontradable endowment of households and borrowing in international financial markets. It is the only agent with access to borrowing and lending and it has the option of defaulting on its debt in which case the economy will be temporarily excluded from international financial markets. The government's motive for borrowing and lending is to smooth the households' consumption of the public good against the fluctuations in the tax revenue resulting from stochastic shocks to the endowments. The cost of default, therefore, is the foregone benefit of consumption smoothing for the periods of exclusion from financial markets. The default decision depends on the comparison of this cost with the one period disutility resulting from repayment of the debt.
Borrowing and lending is done using one-period bonds. Two types of bonds are available to this economy, a tradable denominated bond (T-bond) which delivers one unit of tradable good next period and a nontradable denominated bond (N-bond) which delivers an amount of tradable good equivalent to one unit of the nontradable good. When the government sells a T-bond, i.e purchases a T-bond with a negative face value, it receives q T units of period t tradable goods and promises to pay 1 unit of period t + 1 tradable goods next period.
On the other hand if it sells an N-bond , it receives q N units of period t tradable goods and promises to pay P N units of period t + 1 tradable goods next period. Since payments to foreign lenders cannot be made with nontradable goods, all transactions are settled in tradable goods, although the repayment on N-bonds is indexed to the nontradable price. In this setting, borrowing with T-bonds is analogous to borrowing in foreign currency and Nbonds is analogous to borrowing in domestic currency. In particular, the value of repayment on T-bonds relative to N-bonds increases with a real exchange rate depreciation, i.e. with a decrease in P N . This captures the increase in the relative burden of foreign currency to domestic currency debt with a real depreciation.
The government's budget constraint depends on the tax revenue, the beginning of the period asset position b t , the amount of assets chosen in that period b t+1 , and whether it chooses to default. When the government chooses to repay its debt, the budget constraint is as follows:
In this setup b t+1 < 0 means that the government receives q When the government chooses to default, there is no further borrowing and lending and its current debt is erased. The budget constraint is then given by:
Due to the incompleteness of asset markets, the government cannot completely smooth household consumption by borrowing and lending. However, N-bonds provide better insurance than T-bonds since T-bonds pay a time-and-state invariant amount whereas repayment on N-bonds changes with the state of the economy. When the government issues N-bonds, the amount it must repay decreases in a low output state and thus provides a hedge against the output declines.
The shares of T-bonds and N-bonds are assumed to be constant in the portfolio of assets that the government holds. When it borrows or lends, the share of T-bonds is constant at α; the share of N-bonds is (1 − α). This formulation makes it possible to analyze the effects of debt denomination on default risk by solving the model for different α values.
Besides borrowing in international markets, government taxes the nontradable endowment of the households at a constant rate τ to finance the public good. The assumption that nontradable endowment is taxed is meant to capture the fact that because most government revenue is in domestic currency, foreign currency borrowing causes a currency mismatch in the government balance sheet. Since in this real model, the government can borrow using tradable and nontradable denominated bonds, taxation of the nontradable endowment captures this mismatch resulting from borrowing with tradable denominated bonds 5 .
When the government receives its tax revenues from the households in the form of nontradable goods equal to τy N , it exchanges this for τP N y N units of tradable goods in the goods market since all final transactions of the government are settled in tradable goods.
The markets for tradable and nontradable goods clears with the government's transaction.
Government Problem
The government's objective is to maximize the lifetime utility of households by choosing the amount of borrowing/lending and deciding whether to repay its debt given its level of outstanding assets and the endowment shocks.
The problem of the government can be formulated recursively with the state variables being b t and s t where b t is the level of outstanding assets at the start of the period and s t denotes the vector of exogenous state variables, s t = (y 
where V r (b, s) is the value of repaying the debt and continuing to have access to the financial markets and V d (s) is the value of defaulting.
When the government repays its debt, the value function is the following:
subject to
Equation (7) is the budget constraint of the government when credit markets are open and equations (8) and (9) are the domestic market clearing conditions for tradable and nontradable sectors. Note that in equations (8) and (9) The government decides on its asset holdings for the next period, b 0 , to maximize utility subject to its budget constraint and internalizing the domestic market clearing conditions,
given the level of bond holdings for the current period, b, and the shocks to the tradable and nontradable endowments. Choosing b 0 will pin down the value of the public good for a given level of b since the tax rate is taken as exogenous. Given that the tax revenue fluctuates due to fluctuations in y N and P N , the government wants to smooth households' consumption of the public good by borrowing and lending. The value function under repayment depends on this period's utility and the maximum of next period's value functions for repayment and
The government faces the choice of defaulting or remaining in the credit relationship every period and chooses the option that gives the highest utility. Therefore, the value function for today must account for the decision of the government in the next period, which is captured by
When the government defaults, the economy is excluded from credit markets temporarily and it is assumed that all of its debt is eradicated. It remains in financial autarky for a stochastic number of periods and the probability of regaining access to credit markets in any given period is θ. on default in order to sustain reasonable levels of debt in equilibrium 6 . Therefore, the value function under default is as follows:
where
The government's default decision is summarized by the default function which takes the value 1 for the states in which the government finds it optimal to default. The default function is defined as
Given the government's default function, the default and repayment sets can be defined as follows: A default set, A(b), is the set of exogenous shocks for which default is optimal given the level of assets b; a repayment set, R(b), is the set of shocks for which repayment is optimal.
International Lenders
The international lenders are assumed to be risk neutral. They can borrow funds in the international credit markets at the risk-free interest rate r * . It is also assumed that there is perfect competition among lenders, which drives the expected profits down to zero.
Therefore, they will be willing to lend as long as they are promised the risk-free return in expected value. These conditions imply that prices of bonds are as follows:
T-Bonds:
N-Bonds:
The equilibrium bond prices are consistent with the default probability of the government. For bonds that have a negative face value (government borrowing), bond prices reflect the risk-free rate and a premium for the default probability whereas bonds with positive face value (government lending) only reflect the risk-free rate. Bond prices decrease,
i.e. the interest rates increase, as the default probability increases. Aside from these, the price of the N-bond also reflects the movements in the nontradable price such that a higher P N implies a higher q N . Since the lenders receive a higher payment next period when P N increases, they will be willing to pay a higher price for bonds this period as well.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium for this economy can be defined as one where all agents optimize given the aggregate endowment shocks. In equilibrium households choose consumption of tradables and nontradables taking as given the nontradable price, the government's transfer of the public good and the endowment shocks. Their problem is static and their first order condition equates the marginal rate of substitution between tradable and nontradable consumption to the relative price
This condition shows that the nontradable price is increasing in c T and decreasing in c N .
In the data, real exchange rate depreciations are correlated with reductions in both tradable and nontradable output, whereas in an endowment economy model, shocks to nontradable output generates the opposite result. In order to make the correlations generated by the model consistent with the data, the following endowment structure is assumed: endowments of tradable and nontradable output are characterized by a common stochastic trend and additionally, the tradable output has transitionary shocks around the trend, as explained in further detail in section 3. This formulation provides a simple structure for generating correlations between sectoral output and real exchange rates that are consistent with those observed in the data, using an endowment economy model 7 .
The government decides on its optimal default policy given the endowment shocks and the initial level of assets, subject to the optimization of the households and the international lenders. In the case of repayment, it also chooses the new level of foreign assets. In deciding on its optimal level of asset holdings, the government knows that the prices of bonds will depend on its choice of bond holdings. Bond prices are set by the international lenders consistent with the expected default probability of the government, which depends on its choice of bond holdings. Knowing this, the government will internalize the effect of additional borrowing on the prices of bonds. When the government decides to repay, it maximizes (6) subject to (7), (8) and (9), which gives the following first order condition
The first order condition of the government equates the marginal utility of borrowing/saving today to the expected marginal utility of the value delivered/received tomor-row. Today's choice of assets affects tomorrow's consumption of g only in the states where repayment is optimal. This is reflected by the fact that the marginal utility of tomorrow's consumption is multiplied by the term (1 − D(b 0 , s 0 )) . As long as P N moves in the same direction as output, the marginal disutility of repayment decreases in a low output state and increases in a high output state for α < 1. This effect gets stronger as α increases.
Additional borrowing affects today's utility through two channels. The first effect is an increase in utility as the government receives αq T + (1 − α)q N units of tradable goods this period for each unit of bond issued. The second effect is through the change in bond prices induced by additional borrowing, which is captured by the term b
As the government issues debt, bond prices decrease, since foreign lenders require a higher risk premium due to increased default risk 8 . This leads to a reduction in the marginal utility associated with additional borrowing, as the amount received by the government on additional borrowing is lower than what it would have been if the bond prices were constant.
Knowing that issuing more bonds reduces the price, the government takes the change in the bond prices into account when it decides on the optimal level of bond holdings.
A recursive equilibrium for this economy can be defined as follows 
4.
The following domestic market clearing conditions hold.
Nontradable sector market clearing condition:
Tradable sector market clearing condition:
Quantitative Analysis
The model is solved numerically using data from the Argentine economy in order to an- 
The transitory shock follows an AR(1) process:
where |ρ z | < 1.
The trend is characterized as
where the log growth rate follows an AR(1) process:
The innovations ε In this formulation, transitory shocks are equivalent to shocks to the ratio of tradable to nontradable output. Since both tradable and nontradable output levels are characterized by the same trend, transitory shocks serve the dual purpose of generating the relative variation of sectoral output levels that is observed in the data and of obtaining real exchange rate fluctuations that are consistent with the data.
Output is nonstationary with this characterization since the growth shock has a permanent effect on output. Therefore in the numerical analysis the model is detrended by Γ t−1 . Table ( on the tradable consumption in the CES aggregator, ω, is set to normalize the relative price of nontradables to be equal to one in the autarky steady state. The weight on the CES aggregator in the utility function, ζ, is set to 0.84 to match the average government expenditure to GDP ratio of 16% in Argentina. β is taken as 0.85 and the quarterly risk free interest rate is taken as 1%, which is the US Treasury Bill quarterly interest rate. The tax rate, τ , is set to 0.19 to match the average government revenue to GDP ratio of 14%.
The exogenous probability of reentering the markets is set equal to 0.1, which implies that the defaulting country will return to markets in about 10 quarters on average. This is in line with the exclusion period observed in the data by Gelos, Sahay and Sandleris (2004) 2. Using these initial prices and initial guesses for V r (b, s) and V d (s), iterate on the Bellman equations to solve for the optimal value functions and the optimal policy functions.
3. Given the optimal default decision, update the prices of bonds using equations (17) and (18) . Using these prices, repeat steps 2 and 3 until the bond prices converge.
Results
The model is solved numerically for different shares of T-bonds, denoted by α. In order to analyze how default incentives change with α, I plot the price schedule of T-bonds as a function of assets for two different values of α. Plotting the price of T-bonds rather than the price of N-bonds has the advantage that the default risk can be measured directly by the price of T-bonds as it only depends on the default probability and the risk free interest rate whereas the price of N-bonds also reflects the movements in the price of nontradables. Figure 1 plots the equilibrium price schedule of T-bonds for the highest and lowest shocks for the case where the government is trading only T-bonds, α = 1, and only Nbonds, α = 0. As the figure illustrates, bond prices are an increasing function of foreign assets, i.e. larger debt levels lead to higher interest rates. When the debt level is low, the government always repays its debt and the bond price is equal to the inverse of the risk free rate. As the level of debt increases, the default incentive increases and bond prices decrease, reflecting the fact that the government finds it optimal to default for some realizations of output. At even higher levels of debt, bond prices fall to zero since government defaults for all realizations of the output shocks. Figure 1 As the figure shows, default incentives are higher when the economy is issuing only T-bonds, α = 1, compared with the case where it is only issuing N-bonds, α = 0. For both the highest and the lowest shocks, the bond price faced by the economy is higher, reflecting a smaller default probability, when the government is issuing only N-bonds. Therefore, borrowing with N-bonds reduces the default risk for all levels of output and leads to lower risk premia on the interest rates.
A related result is that borrowing with N-bonds leads to a looser debt limit for the economy. With α = 1 the government refuses to repay its debt for any realization of the output shock when debt level is equal to about -1.89 (50% of the mean aggregate output) whereas for α = 0 this debt limit is about -2.07 (55%). Another point is that the country can borrow at the risk free rate for a higher level of debt when it only issues N-bonds. If the borrowing is done with N-bonds, the economy faces the risk free rate up to -1.65 (44%) whereas with T-bonds this threshold is -1.38 (36.5%).
Default incentives are lower when there is more debt in N-bonds because the government's aim is to smooth the consumption of the public good and issuing N-bonds helps achieve a smoother consumption profile. The price of nontradables decreases for lower levels of output. This leads to a reduction in the tax revenue of the government, τP N y N , and at the same time reduces the amount to be repaid on N-bonds. Likewise both tax revenues and the value of repayment on N-bonds increase in high output states. Since the payment on T-bonds is constant, the amount of public goods provided by the government reflects the fluctuations in the tax revenue if the debt is in T-bonds. Borrowing with N-bonds decreases default risk even in the high output state in spite of the fact that repayment on N-bonds is higher than the repayment on T-bonds in this state due to P N being greater than 1. This shows that the benefit of future consumption smoothing outweighs the cost of high repayment in this period.
Another point to note is that the model predicts that default is more likely in bad times. For a given level of assets, bond prices are lower for the low endowment state for both α = 1 and α = 0 cases, which means that default incentives and interest rates are higher when the output is low.
The simulation results from the benchmark calibration of the model are presented in Table ( Another variable that changes with the value of α is the mean debt to output ratio of the economy. In the data the average ratio of debt to output for the period 1991-2001 for
Argentina is about 38.5%. In the model the average amount of debt held by the economy is 37.4% when α is 1, and 44% when α is 0. The additional debt sustained by the economy in the α = 0 case reflects the fact that the economy faces a looser debt limit and lower interest rates when debt is indexed to the nontradables and therefore is willing to hold more debt at a lower cost.
The last row of Table ( Modeling the output processes by a stochastic trend instead of only transitory shocks helps to generate the countercyclicality of the current account. With only transitory shocks to output, the government would typically have an incentive to save to smooth consumption when the income is temporarily high. With shocks to the trend, a positive shock increases output today but increases output even more tomorrow due to the persistence of the growth rate, and this induces the government to borrow in good times. On the other hand, the fact that the model can generate a countercyclical current account makes it difficult to generate the countercyclicality of interest rates. When borrowing increases, interest rates increase as a result of a movement along the bond price schedule. Since the economy borrows more during good times, the movement along the bond price schedule causes an increase in interest rates in the high output state. There is also a counteractive effect since the bond price schedule shifts due to decreasing default incentives associated with high output.
These two effects are in opposite directions and in the quantitative analysis the shift of the bond price schedule turns out to be bigger causing a decline in interest rates during good times and generating the countercyclicality of the interest rates. However, because of the counteractive effect, the magnitude of this decline is small. Therefore, the correlations of the interest rate with the other variables are not as strong as in the data and have the wrong sign in the case of nontradable output.
When all of the borrowing is in N-bonds (α = 0), the correlations of the interest rates with the other variables change quite drastically. In this case, interest rates are positively correlated with aggregate and sectoral output and real exchange rates, while they are negatively correlated with current account. The reason for the model to generate procyclical interest rates in this case is that the reduction in default incentives in the high output state is less since the repayment in this state is higher due to high nontradable price.
This causes the bond price schedule to shift less compared with the α = 1 case, which is illustrated by the relatively shorter distance between the bond price schedules of the highest and lowest output shocks when α is 0 in Figure (1) . Therefore, in this case the effect of the movement along the bond prices turns out to be bigger than the shift in the bond prices, which makes the interest rates procyclical. Hence, interest rates are positively correlated with aggregate and sectoral output and real exchange rates, and negatively correlated with the current account. Figure 2 shows the last 40 observations of the average interest rates and output over 100 simulations of the model. The interest rates for α = 1 and α = 0 cases are computed for the same output shocks. One result that this figure illustrates is that the interest rates are lower when government issues only N-bonds. This is consistent with the higher bond prices in the α = 0 case that were illustrated in Figure 1 . Another result that this figure shows is the difference in the correlations of output and interest rates for different debt denominations. When debt is in N-bonds, the interest rates move very closely with the output reflecting the procyclicality of interest rates that the simulation results have shown. By contrast, when debt is denominated in tradable units, interest rates move in a countercyclical way, increasing sharply when output is low. Figure 2 
Sensitivity Analysis
This section studies the sensitivity of the results to changes in some key parameter values.
The first parameter considered is the discount factor as presented in the first panel in Table 3 . The most important change in the model's predictions with a change in the discount factor is that a more patient economy defaults less since the value of intertemporal consumption smoothing is higher. As a result of this, both the default rate and the interest rate volatility decrease at higher β values. The average debt holdings of the economy increase as the discount factor decreases since a low discount factor means that the value of future consumption is discounted more heavily and the agents want to enjoy a higher consumption today by borrowing more. In comparing the model's predictions for α = 0 and α = 1, it is seen that the parameter changes do not affect the main conclusions. For all values of β, the default rates and interest rate volatility are lower and the economy can sustain a higher level of debt when all of the borrowing is done with N-bonds. The differences, however, are more pronounced for lower β. The cyclical behavior of interest rates are also consistent with each other for all values of the discount factor. Another parameter that affects the results is the share of output lost with default. An increase in the output cost reduces default incentives, as a result of which default rate and interest rate volatility decrease, and the economy can sustain a higher amount of debt. The model's ability to generate a countercyclical interest rate is also affected by this parameter, where a low output cost leads to the interest rates being slightly procyclical.
The relationship between the α = 0 and α = 1 cases, however, is not affected by this parameter.
The last parameter that is analyzed is the risk aversion parameter. Reducing the level of risk aversion leads to higher default rates and interest rate volatility and lower debt to output ratio. Since lower risk aversion means that the value of consumption smoothing is less, the economy has a higher incentive to default and therefore can sustain lower levels of debt. Again the relationship between different α values is robust to changes in this parameter.
Conclusions
Foreign currency debt is regarded as a critical factor that increases sovereign default risk.
This paper studies the relationship between the share of foreign currency debt and default risk in a real model with two sectors, where foreign currency debt is captured by bonds denominated in the tradable good and domestic currency debt by bonds indexed to the relative price of the nontradable good. It is a small open economy model with stochastic endowments of tradable and nontradable goods, and default risk is determined endogenously by the default probability of the government.
I compare the bond prices for different shares of tradable and nontradable denominated debt and the results show that default risk increases with an increase in the share of tradable denominated debt. Since the price of nontradables moves in the same direction as output, nontradable indexed debt acts as a hedge: in times of distress, the debt value falls, making repayment easier. On the other hand, tradable denominated debt amplifies negative shocks: during bad times, face value increases, making repayment more difficult.
These findings are consistent with the correlation between real exchange rates and output that is observed in the data, and also with the debt repayment difficulties caused by foreign currency borrowing during bad times.
Aside from the fact that nontradable indexed debt leads to lower interest rates, simulation results show that both the default rate and the interest rate volatility decrease when borrowing is done with nontradable indexed bonds. The reduction in default incentives also leads to a looser debt limit and more debt can be sustained in equilibrium. In addition, the welfare level is shown to increase as the economy borrows more with nontradable indexed bonds, since this type of borrowing enables a smoother consumption profile. Different debt denominations also affect the cyclical behavior of the interest rates where tradable denominated debt leads to countercyclical interest rates and nontradable indexed debt leads to procyclical interest rates.
The structure of this paper can be used as a basis for further research. One possible extension is to endogenize the tax rate, which was taken as fixed in this paper, in order to study the interaction between fiscal policy, default risk and debt denomination. This extension can shed light on the effects of the way emerging markets borrow on how they conduct fiscal policy. Borrowing in foreign currency increases the cost of repayment in bad times, which is exactly when these countries have limited access to foreign credit. Therefore, having to repay a high amount on foreign currency debt would force them to conduct a more contractionary fiscal policy. Given that pro-cyclical fiscal policy is a common feature of emerging markets, this extension can provide another explanation about the behavior of fiscal policy in relation to debt structure. Another possibility would be to broaden the types of indexations to include securities such as bonds indexed to GDP, inflation and terms of trade, and to compare them in terms of their effects on default incentives. 
